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Abstract
The widespread adoption of deep learning models places demands on their ro-
bustness. In this paper, we consider the robustness of deep neural networks on
videos, which comprise both the spatial features of individual frames extracted
by a convolutional neural network and the temporal dynamics between adjacent
frames captured by a recurrent neural network. To measure robustness, we study
the maximum safe radius problem, which computes the minimum distance from the
optical flow set obtained from a given input to that of an adversarial example in the
norm ball. We demonstrate that, under the assumption of Lipschitz continuity, the
problem can be approximated using finite optimisation via discretising the optical
flow space, and the approximation has provable guarantees. We then show that
the finite optimisation problem can be solved by utilising a two-player turn-based
game in a cooperative setting, where the first player selects the optical flows and
the second player determines the dimensions to be manipulated in the chosen flow.
We employ an anytime approach to solve the game, in the sense of approximating
the value of the game by monotonically improving its upper and lower bounds.
We exploit a gradient-based search algorithm to compute the upper bounds, and
the admissible A* algorithm to update the lower bounds. Finally, we evaluate our
framework on the UCF101 video dataset.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been developed for a variety of tasks, including self-driving
cars, malicious software classification, and abnormal network activity detection. While the accuracy
of neural networks has significantly improved, matching human cognitive perception, they are
susceptible to adversarial examples. An adversarial example is an input which, whilst initially
classified correctly, is misclassified with a slight, often imperceptible, perturbation. Robustness
of neural networks has been an active topic of investigation, and a number of approaches have
been proposed. (See Related work below.) However, most existing works focus on robustness of
neural networks on image classification problems, where convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are
sufficient. One assumption that CNNs rely on is that inputs are independent of each other, and they
are unable to accept a sequence of input data when the final output is dependent on intermediate
outputs. In reality, though, tasks often contain sequential data as inputs, for instance, in machine
translation [26], speech/handwriting recognition [8, 9, 5], and protein homology detection [10]. To this
end, recurrent neural networks (RNNs) come into play. For RNNs, the connections between neurons
form a directed graph along a temporal sequence, which captures temporal dynamic behaviours.
Unlike CNNs, RNNs can use the internal state (memory) to process sequences of inputs.
In this work, we evaluate robustness of neural networks, including CNNs and RNNs, on videos.
Video classification is challenging because it comprises both the spatial features on each individual
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frames, which can be extracted by CNNs, as well as the temporal dynamics between neighbouring
frames, which can be captured by RNNs. Our main contributions are as follows.
• We define the maximum safe radius problem for DNNs for sequential video inputs by working
directly with the optical flow sets, and, using Lipschitz continuity, discretise the optimisation
problem for computing the maximal such radius into a finite optimisation that approximates it.
• We solve the finite optimisation problem via a two-player turn-based game, where Player I
selects among optical flows and Player II determines manipulations imposed within the chosen
flows, and demonstrate that the solution is Player I’s reward when taking the optimal strategy.
• To approximate the reward of the game, we design an anytime approach, in the sense of
exploiting a gradient-based algorithm to compute the upper bounds and the admissible A*
algorithm to improve the lower bounds.
• We evaluate the proposed framework on the UCF101 video dataset, and present converging
upper and lower bounds of the maximum safe radius.
Related work The notion of robustness for neural networks has been mainly studied in the context
of image classification, but, to the best of our knowledge, there is no work addressing robust-
ness guarantees for videos. We review only works that are most relevant to our approach. Apart
from [19, 18, 17], Szegedy et al. [27] implement a targeted search for adversarial examples for image
classification via minimising the Euclidean distance between the images while keeping missclassifica-
tion. A subsequent improvement, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6], computes a linearised
version of the cost function to obtain the gradients for manipulation directions. Carlini & Wagner [3]
transform the existence of adversarial examples into an optimisation problem so that optimisation
algorithms can be applied. Automated verification methods [7, 22, 23] aim to compute robustness
guarantees against adversarial attacks; we mention constraint solving [21], e.g., Reluplex [14], or ex-
haustive exploration of a discretised neighbourhood of a point [12]. In [31] a game-based verification
approach is proposed for computing the maximal safe radius for feed-forward networks, including
CNNs; our method draws on that approach but we are able to handle video inputs.
Adversarial attacks have also been developed for recurrent neural networks on time-series inputs. For
instance, Papernot et al. [20] extend previous algorithms [19, 6] to craft adversarial input sequences
for RNNs by using computational graph unfolding to compute the forward derivative of the recurrence
cycle. Moreover, both [13] and [30] develop adversarial attacks on the UCF101 dataset; while the
former utilises a two-stream classifier, the latter chooses a CNN + RNN architecture. Apart from
these attack methods, more recent efforts have attempted to to verify the robustness of RNNs, though
not on videos. [15] define a series of RNN abstractions in the form of feed-forward networks,
prove their equivalence to the original ones, and subsequently perform reachability analysis via
Linear Programming (LP) and Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) [1]. Alternatively, [28] extract
deterministic finite automata (DFA) from certain RNNs as the oracle, and use them to evaluate
adversarial accuracy.
2 Preliminaries
Deep neural networks Let N be a neural network with a set of classes C. Given an input v and a
class c ∈ C, we use N (v, c) to denote the confidence of N believing that v is in class c. We work
with the Softmax logit value of the last layer, but the methods can be adapted to the probability
value after normalisation. Thus, N (v) = arg maxc∈C N (v, c) is the class into which N classifies
v. Moreover, as N in this work can have convolutional and recurrent layers, we let NC denote the
convolutional part and NR the recurrent part. Specifically, since the inputs we consider are videos,
we let the input domain D be Rl×w×h×ch, where l is the length of v, i.e., the number of frames, and
w, h, ch are the width, height, and channels of each frame, respectively.
Optical flow In order to capture the dynamic characteristics of the moving objects in a video, we
utilise optical flow [2, 29], which is a pattern of the apparent motion of the image objects between two
consecutive frames caused by the movement of the objects or the camera. There exist methods in the
computer vision community to compute optical flows, for instance, the Lucas-Kanade method [16]
and the Gunnar Farnebäck algorithm [4].
Definition 1 (Optical Flow Equation). Consider a pixel P(x, y, t) in a frame, where x, y denote the
horizontal and vertical positions respectively, and t denotes the time dimension. If after dt time, the
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pixel moves by distance (dx ,dy) in the next frame, then P(x, y, t) = P(x + dx , y + dy , t + dt)
holds. After taking Taylor series approximation, removing common terms, and dividing by dt, the
Optical Flow Equation is fxu + fyv + ft = 0, such that fx = ∂f∂x , fy =
∂f
∂y , u =
∂x
∂t , v =
∂y
∂t ,
where fx, fy are the image gradients, ft is the gradient along time, and the motion (u, v) is unknown.
Distance metrics and Lipschitz continuity In robustness evaluation, Lk distance metrics are
typically used to measure the discrepancy between inputs, denoted as ‖α− α′‖Lk , where k ∈{1, 2,∞} indicates Manhattan (L1), Euclidean (L2), and Chebyshev (L∞) distances. Since our
inputs are videos, i.e., sequences of frames, we will need a suitable metric. In this paper, we will
work directly with Lk distance metrics on optical flows, as described in the next section. Moreover,
we consider neural networks that satisfy Lipschitz continuity, and note that all networks with bounded
inputs are Lipschitz continuous, such as the common fully-connected, convolutional, ReLU, and
softmax layers. We denote by Lipc the Lipschitz constant for class c.
3 Robustness: formulation and approximation
Robustness and maximum safe radius In this work, we focus on pointwise robustness, which is
defined as the invariance of a network’s classification over a small neighbourhood of a given input.
Following this, the robustness of a classification decision for a specific input can be understood as
the non-existence of adversarial examples in the neighbourhood of the input. Here, we work with
the norm ball as a neighbourhood of an input, that is, given an input v, a distance metric Lk, and
a distance d, B(v, Lk, d) = {v′ | ‖v − v′‖Lk ≤ d} is the set of inputs whose distance to v is no
greater than d based on the Lk-norm. Intuitively, the norm ball B with centre v and radius d limits
perturbations to at most d w.r.t. Lk. Then (pointwise) robustness is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Robustness). Given a network N , an input v, a distance metric Lk, and a distance d,
an adversarial example v′ is such that v′ ∈ B(v, Lk, d) and N (v′) 6= N (v). Define the robustness of
v by ROBUST(N , v, Lk, d) |= @ v′ ∈ B(v, Lk, d) s.t. N (v′) 6= N (v). If this holds, we say N is safe
with respect to v within d based on the Lk-norm.
While the above definition returns only True or False, we take a step further to quantify the
measurement of robustness. That is, we compute the distance to the original input in the sense that, if
exceeding the distance, there definitely exists an adversarial example, whereas, within the distance,
all the points are safe. We formally define this distance as the maximum safe radius as follows.
Definition 3 (Maximum Safe Radius). Given a network N , an input v, a distance metric Lk, and a
distance d, the maximum safe radius (MSR) problem is to compute the minimum distance from the
original input v to an adversarial example v′, i.e.,
MSR(N , v, Lk, d) = min
v′∈D
{‖v − v′‖Lk | v′ ∈ B(v, Lk, d) s.t. N (v′) 6= N (v)}. (1)
If v′ does not exist in B, we let MSR(N , v, Lk, d) = d.
Maximum safe radius with respect to optical flow In existing works that evaluate a network’s
robustness over images, it is common to manipulate each image at pixel- or channel-level, and then
compute the distance between the perturbed and original inputs. However, as we deal with time-series
inputs, i.e., videos, instead of manipulating directly on each individual frame, we impose perturbation
on each optical flow that is extracted from every pair of adjacent frames, so that both spatial features
on frames and temporal dynamics between frames can be captured. We define optical flow as follows.
Definition 4 (Optical Flow). Given an input v with length l of frames F , the optical flow extraction
function f : v → P(v) maps an input v to a set of optical flows P(v), where for each optical flow
pt ∈ P(v) we have f : Ft,Ft+1 → pt such that t ∈ [1, l − 1], t ∈ N+.
Then, to study the crafting of adversarial examples, we construct manipulations on the optical flow
to obtain perturbed inputs. Note that if the input values are bounded, e.g., [0, 255] or [0, 1], then the
perturbed inputs need to be restricted to be within the bounds.
Definition 5 ((Atomic) Optical Flow Manipulation). Given an input v with a set of optical flow
P(v), an instruction function Θ : R → N, and a manipulation magnitude τ , we define the input
manipulation operations
MΘ,τ (pt[i]) =
{
pt[i] + Θ(pt[i]) · τ, if i ∈ [1, w × h], i ∈ N+
pt[i], otherwise
(2)
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where w, h denote the width and height of v. Specifically, when Θ : R → {+1,−1}, we say the
manipulation is atomic, denoted asMθ,τ .
Moreover, after remapping the manipulated flow back to the original frame, we obtain a perturbed new
frame, i.e., f ′ : Ft,MΘ,τ (pt) → F ′t+1, and the manipulated flow set, f ′ : v,MΘ,τ (P(v)) → v′,
maps to a new video with the perturbation. To this end, we compute the distance fromMΘ,τ (P(v)) to
P(v) instead of that from v′ to v because the former reflects both spatial and temporal manipulations
simultaneously. That is, we compute the maximum safe radius MSR(N ,P(v), Lk, d) with respect to
optical flow such that N (v′) 6= N (v).
Approximation based on Lipschitz continuity Here, we utilise the fact that the networks studied
in this work are Lipschitz continuous to discretise the neighbourhood space of an optical flow set,
i.e., transform the infinite number of points in the norm ball into a finite number on the grid. First,
based on the definitions of optical flow and input manipulation, we transform the MSR problem into
the following finite maximum safe radius problem.
Definition 6 (Finite Maximum Safe Radius). Given an input v, and a manipulation functionMΘ,τ ,
let v′ = f ′(v,MΘ,τ (P(v))) denote the perturbed input, then the finite maximum safe radius with
respect to optical flow is FMSR(N ,P(v), Lk, d, τ) =
min
pt∈P(v)
min
θ∈Θ
{‖P(v)−MΘ,τ (P(v))‖Lk | MΘ,τ (P(v)) ∈ B(P(v), Lk, d) s.t. N (v′) 6= N (v)}. (3)
If v′ does not exist in B, we let FMSR(N ,P(v), Lk, d, τ) = d.
Intuitively, we aim to find a set of manipulations θ ∈ Θ to impose on a set of optical flows pt ∈ P(v),
such that the distance between the flow sets is minimal, and after the remapping procedure the
perturbed input v′ is an adversarial example. Considering that, within a norm ball B(P(v), Lk, d), the
set of manipulations is finite for a fixed magnitude τ , the FMSR problem only needs to explore a finite
number of the ‘grid’ points. To achieve this, we let g be a τ -grid point such that |g − P(v)| = n× τ ,
and Γ(P(v), Lk, d) be the set of τ -grid points whose corresponding optical flow sets are in B.
Note that all the τ -grid points are reachable from each other via manipulation. By selecting a
proper τ , we ensure that the optical flow space can be covered by small sub-spaces. That is,
B(P(v), Lk, d) ⊆
⋃
g∈Γ B(g, Lk,
1
2 d˜(Lk, τ)), where the grid width d˜(Lk, τ) is |D|τ for L1,
√|D|τ2
for L2, and τ for L∞. Now, we can use FMSR to estimate MSR within the error bounds, as in Figure 1.
Theorem 1 (Error Bounds). Given a manipulation magnitude τ , the optical flow space can be
discretised into a set of τ -grid points, and MSR can be approximated as
FMSR(N ,P(v), Lk, d, τ)− 1
2
d˜(Lk, τ) ≤ MSR(N ,P(v), Lk, d) ≤ FMSR(N ,P(v), Lk, d, τ). (4)
Figure 1: Error bounds.
Then, the problem is to determine τ . Note that, in order to make
sure each τ -grid point g covers all the possible manipulation
points in its neighbourhood, we compute the largest τ . We
now show that τ can be obtained via Lipschitz continuity. For
a network N which is Lipschitz continuous at input v, given
Lipschitz constant Lipc, c ∈ C, for each class, we have
d˜′(Lk, τ) ≤
minc∈C,c 6=N (v){N (v,N (v))−N (v, c)}
maxc∈C,c 6=N (v)(LipN (v) + Lipc)
. (5)
The detailed proof is attached in Appendix A.1. Here we remark
that, while d˜′(Lk, τ) is with respect to input v and d˜(Lk, τ) is
with respect to the flow set P(v), the relation between them,
and similarly that between f and f ′, is dependent on the optical
flow extraction method used. As this is not the main focus of
this work, we do not expand on this topic.
4 A game-based robustness verification approach
In this section, we demonstrate that the finite optimisation problem FMSR of Definition 6 can be
reduced to the computation of a player’s reward when taking an optimal strategy in a game-based
setting. To this end, we adapt the game-based approach proposed in [31] for robustness evaluation of
CNNs on images.
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Problem solving as a two-player turn-based game We define a two-player turn-based game, in
which Player I chooses which optical flow to perturb, and Player II then imposes atomic manipula-
tions of the dimensions within the selected flow.
Definition 7 (Game). Given an input v and its optical flow set P(v), we let G(N , v, Lk, d) =
(S ∪ (S × P(v)), s0, {TI, TII}, L) be a game model, where
• S ∪ (S × P(v)) denotes the set of game states, in which S is the set of Player I’s states whereas
S × P(v) is the set of Player II’s states. Each s ∈ S corresponds to an optical flow set P(s) in
the norm ball B(P(v), Lk, d).
• s0 ∈ S is the initial state such that P(s0) corresponds to the original optical flow set P(v).
• TI : S × P(v) → S × P(v) is Player I’s transition relation defined as TI(s, pt) = (s, pt),
and TII : (S × P(v))×Θ→ S is Player II’s transition relation defined as TII((s, pt), θ) =
Mθ,τ (pt), whereMθ,τ is the atomic manipulation of Definition 5. Intuitively, in a game state
s, Player I selects an optical flow pt of P(s) and enters into a Player II’s state (s, pt), where
Player II then chooses an atomic manipulationMθ,τ on pt.
• L : S ∪ (S × P(v))→ C is the labelling function that assigns each game state’s corresponding
input to a class N (f ′(v,P(s))).
To compute FMSR of Definition 6, we let the game G be cooperative. When it proceeds, two players
take turns - Player I employs a strategy σI to select optical flow, then Player II employs a strategy
σII to determine atomic manipulations - thus forming a path ρ, which is a sequence s0σIs1σIIs2 · · · .
Formally, we define the strategy of the game as follows. Let PathFI be a set of finite paths ending
in Player I’s state, and PathFII be a set of finite paths ending in Player II’s state, we define a
strategy profile σ = (σI, σII), such that σI : PathFI → D(P(v)) of Player I maps a finite path to a
distribution over next actions, and similarly σII : PathFII → D(Θ) for Player II.
Intuitively, by imposing atomic manipulations in each round, the game searches for potential adver-
sarial examples with increasing distance to the original optical flow. Given ρ, let v′ρ = f
′(v, last(ρ))
denote the input corresponding to the last state of ρ, and P(v′ρ) denote its optical flow set, we write
the termination condition tc(ρ) ≡ (N (v′ρ) 6= N (v)) ∨ (
∥∥P(v′ρ)− P(v)∥∥Lk > d), which means that
the game is in a state whose corresponding input is either classified differently, or the associated
optical flow set is outside the norm ball. In order to quantify the distance accumulated along a path,
we define a reward function as follows. Intuitively, the reward is the distance to the original optical
flow if an adversarial example is found, and otherwise it is the weighted summation of the rewards of
its children on the game tree.
Definition 8 (Reward). Give a strategy profile σ = (σI, σII), and a finite path ρ, we define a reward
function
R(σ, ρ) =

∥∥P(v′ρ)− P(v)∥∥Lk , if tc(ρ) and ρ ∈ PathFI∑
pt∈P(v) σI(ρ)(pt) ·R(σ, ρTI(last(ρ), pt)), if ¬tc(ρ) and ρ ∈ PathFI∑
θ∈Θ σII(ρ)(θ) ·R(σ, ρTII(last(ρ), θ)), if ρ ∈ PathFII
, (6)
where σI(ρ)(pt) is the probability of Player I choosing optical flow pt along ρ, and σII(ρ)(θ) is
the probability of Player II choosing atomic manipulationMθ,τ along ρ. Also, ρTI(last(ρ), pt)
and ρTII(last(ρ), θ) are the resulting paths of Player I,Player II applying σI, σII, respectively.
Essentially, it is adding to ρ a new state after transition.
Robustness guarantees We now confirm that the game can return the optical value of the reward
function as the solution to the FMSR problem. Proof of the following theorem is in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 2 (Guarantees). Given an input v, a game model G(N , v, Lk, d), and an optimal strategy
profile σ = (σI, σII), the finite maximum safe radius problem is to minimise the reward of initial
state s0 based on σ, i.e., FMSR(N ,P(v), Lk, d, τ) = minR(σ, s0).
5 Computation of the converging upper and lower bounds
Upper bound: gradient-based search We utilise a gradient-based search algorithm to compute
an upper bound of FMSR. Here, we utilise the spatial features extracted from individual frames.
Definition 9 (Spatial Features). Given a network N , let NC denote the convolutional part, then
NC : v → η ∈ Rl×m maps from input v to its extracted spatial features η, which has consistent
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length l of v and feature dimension m of a frame. Then, we pass η into the recurrent part NR and
obtain the classification results, i.e., NR : η → N (v, c), c ∈ C.
The objective is to manipulate optical flow as imperceptibly as possible while altering the final
classification. We write the objective function as follows:
∀t ∈ [1, l − 1], t ∈ N+, min pt +  ·∇pt(N , v) s.t. ∇pt(N , v) =
∂lNv
∂η
 ∂η
∂pt
(7)
where  is a constant, and∇pt(N , v) is the perturbation imposed on pt. The key point is to minimise∇pt(N , v) so that the perturbation is unnoticeable while simultaneously changing N (v). Here, we
utilise the loss of N on v, denoted as lNv , to quantify the classification change. Intuitively, if lNv
increases, N (v) is more likely to change. By utilising the concept of spatial features η, we rewrite
∇pt(N , v) as ∂lNv /∂η  ∂η/∂pt, where ∂lNv /∂η denotes the gradient of the network’s loss w.r.t
the spatial features, ∂η/∂pt denotes the gradient of the spatial features w.r.t the optical flow, and 
denotes element-wise/Hadamard product. We introduce the computation of the two parts below.
On one hand, ∂η/∂pt essentially exhibits the relation between spatial features and optical flow. Here
we reuse input manipulation (Definition 5) to compute ∂η/∂pt, though instead of manipulating the
flow we impose perturbation directly on the frame. Intuitively, we manipulate the pixels of each frame
to see how the subtle optical flow between the original and the manipulated frames will influence the
spatial features. Each time we manipulate a single pixel of a frame, we get a new frame which is
slightly different. If we performMΘ,τ on pixel F [m,n], and denote the manipulated frame as Fm,n,
its spatial features as ηm,n, the subtle optical flow between Fm,n and F as δpm,n, then ∂η/∂pt can
be computed as in Equation (8). On the other hand, ∂lNv /∂η shows how the spatial features will
influence the classification, which can be reflected by the loss of the network. After getting η from
NC, we can obtain lNv fromNR. If we perform pixel manipulationMΘ,τ (F [m,n]) on frame F , and
obtain a new input, denoted as vF [m,n], then for this frame we have the gradient in Equation (9).
∂η
∂pt
=

‖η1,1 − η‖Lk
‖δp1,1‖Lk
· · · ‖η1,w − η‖Lk‖δp1,w‖Lk
...
. . .
...
‖ηh,1 − η‖Lk
‖δph,1‖Lk
· · · ‖ηw,h − η‖Lk‖δpw,h‖Lk

w×h
(8)
∂lNv
∂η
=

lNvF[1,1] − lNv
‖η1,1 − η‖Lk
· · ·
lNvF[1,w] − lNv
‖η1,w − η‖Lk
...
. . .
...
lNvF[h,1] − lNv
‖ηh,1 − η‖Lk
· · ·
lNvF[w,h] − lNv
‖ηw,h − η‖Lk

w×h
(9)
Remark. From the definition of spatial features, i.e., η = NC(v), we know that the spatial features
η only depend on each individual F of v and do not capture the temporal information between
frames. That is, when NC remains unchanged, η and F have a direct relation, which indicates that
the gradient of the latter can reflect that of the former. Therefore, during implementation, instead of
the distance between ηm,n and η, we calculate that between Fm,n and F , i.e., ‖Fm,n −F‖Lk .
Algorithm 1: Admissible A* for DNN Verification
Input : G(N , v, Lk, d), tc
Output : Lower bound of FMSR
1 procedure ADMISSIBLEA*(G(N , v, Lk, d), tc):
2 root← s0 ;
3 while (¬tc) do
4 P(root)← Player I(root,Farneback) ;
5 for pt in P(root) do
6 pt[i]← Player II(pt) ;
7 newnodes←Mθ,τ (pt[i]) ;
8 for node in newnodes do
9 dist← DistanceEstimation(node) ;
10 root← min(dist) ;
11 return ‖P(root)− P(s0)‖Lk
Lower bound: admissible A* We ex-
ploit admissible A* to compute the lower
bound of Player I’s reward, i.e., FMSR.
An A* algorithm gradually unfolds the
game model into a tree, in the sense that
it maintains a set of children nodes of the
expanded partial tree, and computes an es-
timate for each node. The key point is that
in each iteration it selects the node with
the least estimated value to expand. The
estimation comprises two components: (1)
the exact reward up to the current node,
and (2) the estimated reward to reach the
goal node. To guarantee the lower bound,
we need to make sure that the estimated
reward is minimal. For this part, we let the A* algorithm be admissible, which means that,
given a current node, it never overestimates the reward to the terminal goal state. For each
state s in the game model G, we assign an estimated distance value DistanceEstimation(s) =
‖P(s)− P(s0)‖Lk + heuristic(P(s)), where ‖P(s)− P(s0)‖Lk is the distance from the original
state s0 to the current state s based on the Lk-norm, and heuristic(P(s)) is the admissible heuristic
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(a) SoccerJuggling at 0 s and 1 s. (b) Optical flow and its magnitude (left) and direction (right).
Figure 2: Illustration of how optical flow can capture the dynamics of the moving objects. (a): Two
sampled frames from SoccerJuggling with original size 320× 240× 3. (b): The optical flow (red
arrows) extracted between the frames, and its two characteristics: magnitude and direction.
function that estimates the distance from the current state s to the terminal state. Here, we use
d˜(Lk, τ) in Equation (4). We present the admissible A* algorithm in Algorithm 1.
6 Experimental results
This section presents the evaluation results of our framework to approximate the maximum safe radius
w.r.t optical flow on a video dataset. We perform the experiments on a Linux server with NVIDIA
GeForce GTX Titan Black GPUs, and the operating system is Ubuntu 14.04.3 LTS. The results are
obtained from a VGG16 [24] + LSTM [11] network on the UCF101 [25] video dataset. Details about
the dataset, the network structure, and training/testing parameters can be found in Appendix A.3.
Adversarial examples via manipulating optical flows We illustrate how optical flow can capture
the temporal dynamics of the moving objects in neighbouring frames. In this case, we exploit the
Gunnar Farnebäck algorithm [4] as it computes the optical flow for all the pixels in a frame, i.e.,
dense optical flow, instead of a sparse feature set. Figure 2 presents an optical flow generated from
two adjacent frames of a video labelled as SoccerJuggling: (a) shows two frames sampled at 0 s
and 1 s of the video; and (b) exhibits the characteristics of the flow: magnitude and direction. We
observe that, while the indoor background essentially remains unchanged, the motion of the player
together with the football is clearly captured by the flow. See more examples in Appendix A.4. We
now demonstrate how a very slight perturbation on the flow, almost imperceptible to human eyes, can
lead to a misclassification of the whole video. Figure 3 exhibits that a video originally classified as
LongJump with confidence 100.00% is manipulated into FloorGymnastics with confidence 86.10%.
Two sampled frames at 1 s and 2 s are shown in the top row. If we compare the original optical flow of
magnitude and direction (2nd row) generated from the frames with the perturbed ones (bottom row),
we can hardly notice the difference (3rd row). However, the classification of the video has changed.
Converging upper and lower bounds We illustrate the convergence of the bound computation
for the maximum safe radius with respect to manipulations on the optical flows extracted from the
consecutive frames of a video. Take a FloorGymnastics video as an example. Figure 4 exhibits five
sampled frames (top row) and the optical flows extracted between them (2nd row). By utilising
our framework, we present the approximation of MSR in Figure 5, where the red line indicates the
descending trend of the upper bound, whereas the blue line denotes the ascending trend of the
lower bound. Intuitively, after 20 iterations of the gradient-based algorithm, the upper bound, i.e.,
minimum distance to an adversarial example, is 2100.45 based on the L2 distance metric. That is, any
manipulation imposed on the flows exceeding this upper bound is definitely unsafe. Figure 4 (3rd row)
shows some of such unsafe perturbations on each optical flow, which result in the misclassification
of the video into FrontCrawl with confidence 97.04%. As for the lower bound, we observe that,
after 1500 iterations of the admissible A* algorithm, the lower bound reaches 146.61. That is,
manipulations within this L2-norm ball is absolutely safe. Some of such safe perturbations can be
found in the bottom row of Figure 4. Due to space limit, we include another example in Appendix A.5.
Efficiency and scalability As for the computation time, the upper bound requires the gradient of
optical flow with respect to the frame, and because we extract dense optical flow, the algorithm
needs to traverse each pixel of a frame to impose atomic manipulations; thus it takes around 30
minutes to retrieve the gradient of each frame. Once the gradient of the whole video is obtained, and
the framework enters into the cooperative game, i.e., the expansion of the tree, each iteration takes
minutes. Meanwhile, for the lower bound, the admissible A* algorithm expands the game tree in each
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Figure 3: Subtle gradient-
based perturbations on op-
tical flows result in misclas-
sification from LongJump
(1.0) to FloorGymnastics
(86.10%).
Figure 4: Examples of unsafe and safe perturbations on the optical
flows of a FloorGymnastics video. Top row: five sampled frames
from 0 s to 4 s. 2nd row: optical flows of the frames from 0 s to 5 s.
3rd row: unsafe perturbations on the flows corresponding to the upper
bound. Bottom row: safe perturbations on the flows corresponding
to the lower bound.
Figure 5: Convergence of maximum safe radius
of the FloorGymnastics video with respect to
manipulations on extracted optical flows.
Figure 6: Lower bounds of maximum safe ra-
dius of a HammerThrow video with different
dimensions of manipulated optical flows.
iteration which takes minutes, and updates the lower bound wherever applicable. Note that initially
the lower bound may be updated in each iteration, but when the size of the game tree increases, it can
take hours to update. Moreover, we analyse the scalability of our framework via an example of a
HammerThrow video in Figure 6, which shows the lower bounds obtained with respect to different
dimensions of the manipulated optical flows. We observe that, within the same number of iterations,
decreasing input dimension leads to faster convergence.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we study the maximum safe radius problem of neural networks, including CNNs and
RNNs, with respect to the optical flow sets extracted from sequential videos. By relying on Lipschitz
continuity, we transform the problem to a finite optimisation whose approximation has provable
guarantees, and subsequently reduce the finite optimisation to the solution of a two-player turn-based
game. We design algorithms to compute the upper and lower bounds, and demonstrate that the bounds
converge to the maximum safe radius in the experiments.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of the error bounds in Theorem 1
In this section, we provide the detailed proof for the error bounds in Theorem 1, in particular, the
value of d˜′(Lk, τ) in Equation (5).
Proof. We first define the concept of the minimum confidence margin.
Definition 10 (Minimum Confidence Margin). Given a network N , an input v, and a class c, we
define the minimum confidence margin as
Con(v, c) = min
c′∈C,c′ 6=c
{N (v, c)−N (v, c′)}. (10)
Intuitively, it is the discrepancy between the maximum confidence of v being classified as c and the
second maximum confidence of v being classified as c′. Then for any input v′ whose optical flow set
is in the subspace of a grid point g, and the input v corresponding to this optical flow set g, we have
Con(v,N (v))− Con(v′,N (v))
= min
c∈C,c6=N (v)
{N (v,N (v))−N (v, c)} − min
c∈C,c6=N (v)
{N (v′,N (v))−N (v′, c)}
≤ max
c∈C,c6=N (v)
{N (v,N (v))−N (v, c)−N (v′,N (v)) +N (v′, c)}
≤ max
c∈C,c6=N (v)
{|N (v,N (v))−N (v′,N (v))|+ |N (v′, c)−N (v, c)|}
≤ max
c∈C,c6=N (v)
LipN (v) · ‖v − v′‖Lk + Lipc · ‖v − v′‖Lk
≤ max
c∈C,c6=N (v)
(LipN (v) + Lipc) · ‖v − v′‖Lk
≤ max
c∈C,c6=N (v)
(LipN (v) + Lipc) · d˜′(Lk, τ)
(11)
Now, since the optical flow set of v′ is in the subspace of g, we need to ensure that no class
change occurs between v and v′. That is, Con(v′,N (v)) ≥ 0, which means Con(v,N (v)) −
Con(v′,N (v)) ≤ Con(v,N (v)). Therefore, we have
max
c∈C,c 6=N (v)
(LipN (v) + Lipc) · d˜′(Lk, τ) ≤ Con(v,N (v)). (12)
And as g is the grid point, the minimum confidence margin for its corresponding input v can be
computed. Finally, we replace Con(v,N (v)) with its definition, then we have
d˜′(Lk, τ) ≤
min
c∈C,c6=N (v)
{N (v,N (v))−N (v, c)}
max
c∈C,c 6=N (v)
(LipN (v) + Lipc)
. (13)
A.2 Proof of the guarantees in Theorem 2
In this section, we provide the proof for the robustness guarantees in Theorem 2.
Proof. On one hand, we demonstrate that ‖P(v′)− P(v)‖Lk ≥ R(σ, s0) for any optical flow set
P(v′) as a τ -grid point, such that P(v′) ∈ B(P(v), Lk, d) and its corresponding input is an adversarial
example. Intuitively, it means that Player I’s reward from the game G on the initial state s0 is no
greater than the Lk distance to any τ -grid manipulated optical flow set. That is, the reward value
R(σ, s0), once computed, is a lower bound of the optimisation problem FMSR(N ,P(v), Lk, d, τ).
Note that the reward value can be obtained as every τ -grid point can be reached by some game play,
i.e., a sequence of atomic manipulations.
On the other hand, from the termination condition tc(ρ) of the game, we observe that, for some P(v′),
if R(σ, s0) ≤ ‖P(v′)− P(v)‖Lk holds, then there must exist some other P(v′′) such that R(σ, s0) =‖P(v′′ − P(v))‖Lk . Therefore, we have that R(σ, s0) is the minimum value of ‖P(v′′ − P(v))‖Lk
among all the τ -grid points P(v′) such that P(v′) ∈ B(P(v), Lk, d) and their corresponding inputs
are adversarial examples.
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Finally, we notice that the minimum value of ‖P(v′)− P(v)‖Lk is equivalent to the optical value
required by Equation (3).
A.3 Details of the video dataset and the network
As a popular benchmark for human action recognition in videos, UCF101 [25] consists of 101
annotated action classes, e.g., JugglingBalls (human-object interaction), HandstandPushups (body-
motion only), HairCut (human-human interaction), PlayingPiano (playing musical instruments),
and FloorGymnastics (sports). It labels 13 320 video clips of 27 hours in total, and each frame has
dimension 320× 240× 3.
In the experiments, we exploit a VGG16 + LSTM architecture, in the sense of utilising the VGG16
network to extract the spatial features from the UCF101 video dataset and then passing these features
to a separate RNN unit LSTM. For each video, we sample a frame every 1000 ms and stitch them
together into a sequence of frames. Specifically, we run every frame from every video through
VGG16 with input size 224 × 224 × 3, excluding the top classification part of the network, i.e.,
saving the output from the final Max-Pooling layer. Hence, for each video, we retrieve a sequence of
extracted spatial features. Subsequently, we pass the features into a single LSTM layer, followed by a
Dense layer with some Dropout in between. Eventually, after the final Dense layer with activation
function Softmax, we get the classification outcome.
We use the categorical cross-entropy loss function and the accuracy metrics for both the VGG16 and
LSTM models. Whilst the former has a SGD optimiser and directly exploits the imagenet weights,
we train the latter through a rmsprop optimiser and get 99.15% training accuracy as well as 99.72%
testing accuracy. Specifically, when the loss difference cannot reflect the subtle perturbation on
optical flow during the computation of upper bounds, we use the discrepancy of logit values instead.
A.4 More examples of the optical flows extracted from different videos
Apart from Figure 2 in Section 6, here we include more examples of the optical flows extracted from
another two videos with classifications BalanceBeam (Figure 7) and FrontCrawl (Figure 8).
Figure 7: Examples of the optical flows extracted from a BalanceBeam video. Top row: four sampled
frames from 0 s to 3 s with original size 320 × 240 × 3. 2nd row: the optical flows (blue arrows)
extracted between the frames. 3rd row: one of optical flow’s characteristics: magnitude. Bottom row:
the other one of optical flow’s characteristics: direction.
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Figure 8: Examples of the optical flows extracted from a FrontCrawl video. Top row: four sampled
frames from 0 s to 3 s with original size 320 × 240 × 3. 2nd row: the optical flows (blue arrows)
extracted between the frames. 3rd row: one of optical flow’s characteristics: magnitude. Bottom row:
the other one of optical flow’s characteristics: direction.
A.5 Another example of the converging upper and lower bounds
Figure 9: Convergence of maximum safe radius of the HammerThrow video with respect to ma-
nipulations on extracted optical flows. The red line denotes the decreasing upper bound from the
gradient-based algorithm, and the blue line denotes the increasing lower bound from admissible A*.
Apart from the FloorGymnastics example (Figures 4 and 5, Section 6), we attach another example to
illustrate the convergence of the upper and lower bounds. Similarly, Figure 10 exhibits four sampled
frames (top row) from a HammerThrow video and the optical flows extracted between them (2nd
row). The descending upper bounds (red) and the ascending lower bounds (blue) to approximate
the value of MSR are presented in Figure 9. Intuitively, after 20 iterations of the gradient-based
algorithm, the upper bound, i.e., minimum distance to an adversarial example, is 5670.31 based on
the L2 distance metric. That is, any manipulation imposed on the flows exceeding this upper bound
is definitely unsafe. Figure 10 (3rd row) shows some of such unsafe perturbations on each optical
flow, which result in the misclassification of the video into FrontCrawl with confidence 99.86%. As
for the lower bound, we observe that, after 1000 iterations of the admissible A* algorithm, the lower
bound reaches 52.95. That is, manipulations within this L2-norm ball is absolutely safe. Some of
such safe perturbations can be found in the bottom row of Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Examples of unsafe and safe perturbations on the optical flows of a HammerThrow video.
Top row: five sampled frames from 0 s to 3 s. 2nd row: optical flows of the frames from 0 s to 4 s.
3rd row: unsafe perturbations on the flows corresponding to the upper bound. Bottom row: safe
perturbations on the flows corresponding to the lower bound.
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